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Abstract
The present article tries to analyze the role played in Hans Jonas’ ethical reflection by religious—namely, Jewish—tradition. Jonas goes in
search of an ultimate foundation for his ethics and his theory of the good in order to face the challenges currently posed by technology’s
nihilistic attitude towards life and ethics. Jonas’ ethical investigation enters into the domain of metaphysics, which offers an incomparable
contribution to the philosophical endeavour, without undermining its overall independence. In this way, Jewish categories—such as remorse,
shame, sacrifice, repentance, and self-restraint—strengthen the philosopher’s ethical reflection, since he considers them to be essential moral
values  for  the  technological  epoch.  Yet  the  reference to  the  Jewish tradition supplies Jonas’  ethical  endeavour with  a  powerful but only
hypothetical insight into transcendence.
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Introduction
Against the recurring temptation to despise the world and act irresponsibly that is evidenced by the mainstream of Modernity, the ethical
thinking of the Jewish philosopher Hans Jonas (1903-1993) insists on the intrinsic value of life and on the moral duty to preserve it. However,
today’s technological progress puts dramatically in evidence that the fulfilment of this task requires an overall reconsideration of the hendiadys
of freedom and responsibility.
Hans Jonas believes that such an endeavour ought to be carried out in primis by philosophy. However, he also claims that this philosophical
meditation cannot avoid entering into the domain of metaphysics by inquiring into the concept of God and clarifying His relationship to the
being of world and humankind. In this respect, the Jewish tradition is a relevant source of inspiration for Hans Jonas’ ethical thinking.
However,  the  peculiarity of  this  relationship  between philosophy and religion gives  rise to the  following questions:  What role do Jewish
categories play in Jonas’ ethical reflection? Does the latter depend on the author’s religious beliefs and, subsequently, lose its independence? Or
do  religious  categories—such  as  sacrifice,  repentance,  shame,  and  self-restraint—just  supply  appropriate  and  significant  symbols  for  his
philosophical inquiry into the foundations of our existence?
The ambivalent essence of human nature
In an interesting and well-known thought experiment, Jonas tries to express “mythically” the relationship between God, human beings and the
cosmos.1 (#_ftn1) On this occasion, he draws inspiration from the Jewish tradition and specifically from Isaac Luria’s Kabbalah, and from his
idea of tzimtzum (contraction, withdrawal, self-limitation):
In the beginning, for unknowable reasons, the ground of being, or the Divine, chose to give itself over to the chance and risk and endless variety of becoming. And wholly so: entering
into the adventure of space and time, the deity held back nothing of itself: no uncommitted or unimpaired part remained to direct, correct, and ultimately guarantee the devious
working-out of its destiny in creation.2 (#_ftn2)
In other words, the creation of the cosmos comes about through God’s forswearing of omnipotence. We do not know why God limits Himself.
Yet His decision makes room for a possibility, namely the existence of the cosmos as an autonomous being:
In order that the world might be, and be for itself, God renounced his own being, divesting himself of his deity—to receive it back from the Odyssey of time weighted with the chance
harvest of unforeseeable temporal experience: transfigured or possibly even disfigured by it. In such self-forfeiture of divine integrity for the sake of unprejudiced becoming, no other
foreknowledge can be admitted than that of possibilities which cosmic being offers in its own terms: to these, God committed his cause in effacing himself for the world.3 (#_ftn3)
The central idea in this passage is that God’s worldly adventure comes to a crucial turning point with the advent of human beings, through their
knowledge  and  freedom—that  is,  the  double-edged  gift  of  working  for  the  accomplishment  of  good  or  evil.  On  the  one  hand,  with  the
“appearance of man, transcendence awakened to itself.”4 (#_ftn4) Indeed, human freedom is the clearest sign of the deep relationship between
God and the world. God’s primeval renunciation of omnipotence was—of course—absolute and irrevocable, yet it expressed the hope that in the
future the creation could somehow awaken—that is, become aware of its divine and transcendent essence. This is precisely what happens
thanks to humankind. On the other hand, the destiny of this awakening relies uncertainly on human actions and decisions:
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As transcendence grows with the terribly ambiguous harvest of deeds, our impact on eternity is for good and for evil: we can build and we can destroy, we can heal and we can hurt, we
can nourish and we can starve divinity, we can perfect and we can disfigure its image: and the scars of one are as enduring as the lustre of the other.
5
 (#_ftn5)
In  this  sense,  each  human  being  is  responsible  for  God’s  destiny,  which  manifests  itself  in  his/her  heart.  Therefore—according  to
Jonas—human existence as such may be understood as a cosmic and divine adventure of liberty and responsibility, which takes place thanks to
God and His primordial decision, and in front of Him. Through their deeds human beings play an active and self-conscious role in this divine
enterprise, since humanity bears witness to the awakening of transcendence to itself. This means that each human act is like a tile in a mosaic
that represents the history of the relationship between God, human beings, and the world.  Moreover, since God has opted for impotence,
human freedom and responsibility gain cosmic relevance, in an ambivalent sense: thanks to human beings, God’s creation may continue its
worldly adventure, or this worldly adventure may be ruined. Human beings have the liberty to be faithful to God’s moral obligation, which is
testified by life, or they may decide to refuse this obligation.
However, from a historical point of view good and evil do not seem to have equal opportunities. Jonas believes that the advance of modern
technology has had an enormous impact on human freedom and increased its propensity for irresponsibility. Jonas warns that the “shadow of
the Bomb”6 (#_ftn6) and the damage to the Earth’s environment caused by Promethean technological progress7 (#_ftn7) show that “we literally
hold in our faltering hands the future of the divine adventure and must not fail Him, even if we would fail ourselves.”8 (#_ftn8)
Hence—in Jonas’ view—the mythical hypothesis concerning the role played by God in the cosmic creation evidences the difficult task that the
human hendiadys of freedom and responsibility currently has to face. However, before continuing our investigation, we must clarify why Jonas’
appeal to God’s creative role does not undermine the independence of his philosophical investigation.
As we shall see in more detail, a central theme of Jonas’ philosophical reflection is his penetrating criticism of modern thought. The modern
scientific method, its gnoseological claim to simplicity and abstraction, and the shift in its ontological framework from dualism (Descartes) to
materialism led to the following two commitments: the thorough investigation of reality by means of physics and its ontological reducibility to
physical properties. As a consequence, any topic claiming to go beyond the sphere of physics was considered no more than flatus vocis and
banned from the modern conception of knowledge and rationality.
However, in Jonas’ view this reductive process has dire consequences. Firstly, the abovementioned commitments do not seem to be aware that
their conclusions cannot but be arbitrary, supposed, and partial. In fact, the demand to reduce reality to physics and to physical properties does
not arise through scientific inquiry but is instead the result of a preliminary decision on and selection of gnoseological parameters. Secondly,
there is an observable fact—namely, the phenomenon of life—that fails to be completely understood by modern physics.9 (#_ftn9) Because of
these  difficulties,  Jonas  comes  to  affirm the “possibility  of  a  rational  metaphysics,  despite  Kant’s  contrary  verdict,  if  the  rational  is  not
preemptively determined by the standards of positive science.”10 (#_ftn10)
So, there is no incompatibility between rationality and metaphysical inquiry, especially because the latter is to be understood as a “conjecture
on ultimate  and undemonstrable (but  by no means,  therefore,  meaningless)  matters.”11  (#_ftn11)  Nevertheless—we may ask—why does the
possibility  of metaphysics become a necessity  for Jonas’ philosophical reflection, as evidenced by the myth concerning the creation of the
cosmos? And why is such an investigation given a mythical form? Jonas answers as follows:
Myth may happen to adumbrate a truth which of necessity is unknowable and even, in direct concepts, ineffable, yet which, by intimations to our deepest experience, lays claim upon
our powers of giving indirect account of it in revocable, anthropomorphic images. In the great pause of metaphysics in which we are, and before it has found its own speech again, we
must entrust ourselves to this, admittedly treacherous, medium at our risk. The myth, if only it is conscious of its experimental and provisional nature and does not pose as doctrine, can
from the necessity of that pause bridge the vacuum with its fleeting span.
12
 (#_ftn12)
In sum, metaphysics and myth (which—thanks to their powerful images and symbols—also play a central role in religious thinking) do not
belong to the domain of  irrationality,  but form the complex mosaic of human rationality,  in addition to philosophy and science. Strictly
speaking, philosophy and religion are independent from each another.13 (#_ftn13) Nevertheless, myth may supply both with a provisional and
hypothetical insight into transcendence.
The irresponsibility of Modernity: the downfall of remorse, shame, and sacrifice
It is now time to take a closer look at Jonas’ criticism of Modernity. He asks what distinguishes the modern knowledge of nature and quotes F.
Bacon’s view that “knowledge must deliver man from the yoke of necessity by meeting necessity on its ground, and achieves freedom for him by
delivering the things into  his  power.”14  (#_ftn14)  This is  precisely  what  modern science and technology have tried to attain through their
quantitative interpretation of being. As a result, “the modern knowledge of nature, very unlike the classical one, is a ‘know-how’ and not a
‘know-what,’ and on this basis it makes good Bacon’s contention that knowledge is power.”15 (#_ftn15) Any question concerning the meaning or
the value  of things is—therefore—considered irrelevant. All that matters is to gain power over reality and to dominate it with science and
technology. But in Jonas’ view this has alarming consequences:
If ever we entrust or resign ourselves wholly to the self-corrective mechanics of the interplay of science and technology, we shall have lost the battle for man. For science, with its
application governed solely by its own logic, does not really leave the meaning of happiness open: it has prejudged the issue, in spite of its own value-freedom. The automatism of its
use—insofar as this use carries beyond the recurrent meeting of the recurrent emergency created by itself—has set the goal of happiness in principle: indulgence in the use of things.
Between the two poles of emergency and indulgence, of resourcefulness and hedonism, set up by the ever-expanding power over things, the direction of all effort and thereby the issue of
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the good tends to be predecided. But we must not let that issue be decided by default.16 (#_ftn16)
In  other  words,  this  daughter  of  Modernity  called  technology  only  aims  at  its  self-perpetuation.  The  only  acknowledged  value  is  the
development of technology’s competence and, as a result, the human pursuit of happiness is reduced to the achievement of technological goals.
This is precisely what Max Weber referred to as the reversal of the means-end relationship:17 (#_ftn17) the production of means itself becomes
an end—in other words, happiness loses its rank of autonomous moral value and is reduced to a motivational incentive for human beings to
perform more efficiently their technological duties.
According to Jonas,  the  trouble  with  Modernity is  that it  reduces  the idea of  human freedom to  the achievement of  technical goals  and
unrestrained power over  nature.18  (#_ftn18)  As a consequence,  the modern conception of  freedom implies  the  negation of  the ambivalent
essence of human nature: there is no need to temper freedom with responsibility, since there is supposedly no need to set limits on human
freedom. Technology is the magic wand, which can successfully solve any problem. This is the ultimate outcome of technology: it has deeply
altered the very nature of human action.19 (#_ftn19)
What  are  the  further  consequences  of  modern  technology  for  the  idea  of  human  existence?  The  most  important  is  the  subversion  of
fundamental notions, such as meaning and value: “Meaning is no longer found but is ‘conferred’. Values are no longer beheld in the vision of
objective  reality,  but  are  posited as  feats  of  valuation.”20  (#_ftn20)  A further  change  affects  the  modern  notion  of  human  action  and  its
relationship to reality:
A world reduced to a mere manifestation of power also admits toward itself—once the transcendent reference has fallen away and man is left with it and himself alone—nothing but the
relation of power, that is, of mastery.
21
 (#_ftn21)
In brief, Modernity culminates in Nietzsche’s nihilism. The human being suffers from an existential loss of meaning, which deposes the images
and  metaphors  traditionally  used  to  express  his/her  specific  identity.22  (#_ftn22)  Indeed,  the  most  significant  achievement  of  modern
anthropology  is—according  to  the  nineteenth  century  Italian  poet  and  philosopher  Giacomo  Leopardi—the  human  being’s  “somma
conformabilità” [remarkable adaptability].23 (#_ftn23) This means that it is virtually impossible to find an answer to the question concerning the
human being’s essence. There is really no such essence, since the human being is what he performs and produces technologically: as Hannah
Arendt had already stated, the outcome of Modernity is the reduction of the homo sapiens to the homo faber.24 (#_ftn24) Hence, the human
being has lost its own identity and image.
Touching on the political aspect of the problem, Jonas adds that none of the twentieth century’s major political  ideologies are capable of
restoring  any  such image or  identity.  To  be  sure,  both  Marxism and Capitalism are  nothing  else  but  executors  of  the  Baconian ideal  of
Modernity.25 (#_ftn25) That is, they both aim at the pursuit of individual and social happiness with the help of technology, but they uncritically
believe in the idea of progress and in technology as a vehicle for progress. For this reason they fail to see that the employment of technology has
reversed the means-end relationship. Their belief in happiness as the goal of  human existence is  nothing but a means to the real end of
technology: its self-perpetuation and its increase of power.
So—to recapitulate briefly—Modernity depreciates the complexity of human nature. Indeed, Modernity ignores that responsibility and freedom
are interwoven in human nature, and it ignores that freedom may give rise to a twofold outcome—namely, good or evil. In other words, the
modern Weltanschauung erases completely the difference between good and evil, for—in a sense—the human technological being—Nietzsche’s
Übermensch—cannot act badly or commit anything wrong: he/she is simply beyond good and evil. Since modern freedom is unchained from
its counterbalance—namely, responsibility—, there is no place for morality, moral sense, remorse, self-sacrifice, or shame, notions that appear
to be relics of the past. In such circumstances, the human being is simply not capable of perceiving the difference between good and evil.
And—even worse—the human being is not capable of going beyond self-concern, since there is no other value than the efficient enhancement of
one’s own freedom. But freedom alone leads humankind to despair and vacuity, and to the nihilistic belief in the pure unrelatedness of human
existence to others and nature.26 (#_ftn26)
The need for responsibility
Many of Modernity’s consequences are undoubtedly problematic, yet an entire epoch cannot be overcome or erased as a mere mistake. Jonas
insists that one of the major philosophical tasks that should be undertaken is a widespread evaluation of Modernity’s positive and negative
aspects. After all, modern technology certainly appears to be the full expression of humankind’s essential desire to enhance its own freedom
and give shape to the world. And the Baconian modern ideal of progress—which originated technology—offers a far more realistic and effective
philosophical background than the static and dualistic one (including Descartes’) that produced a distorted understanding of human essence as
completely separated from the dynamics of the physical and biological world.27 (#_ftn27)
Yet—as we have already seen—the technological triumph of Modernity plays a decisive role in the development of dangerous illusions, such as
the self-sufficiency of liberty and the negation of the ontological and ethical complexity of human beings. More than just this, Jonas points out
that technology has altered the nature of human action and that the lack of caution in the employment of technology may lead to the extinction
of earthly life. These are the reasons why responsibility becomes a central political and ethical issue:
The crucial point in all this is that the nature of human action has changed and with it the focus of ethical theory. For, reflecting on everything—on the magnitude of our novel powers
Sacrifice and Repentance as Self-Restraint. Hans Jonas’ Ethics for a T... http://cjs.utoronto.ca/tjjt/node/30
3 di 11 28/09/2012 14:50
and the novelty of their products, their impact on the human condition everywhere, and the dynamism they let lose into indefinite future—we must see that responsibility with a never
known burden and range has moved into the center of political morality. This is why we make the present effort to clarify the phenomenon of responsibility as such.
28
 (#_ftn28)
Interesting, Jonas’ idea of responsibility reverberates with images and symbols of religious—namely, Jewish—derivation. According to Jonas,
the idea of “res-ponsibility” (in German “Ver-antwortung”) encapsulates the basic conception of religion as the effort to connect the human
being with God. Therefore, religion consists in the human disposition to search for an appropriate relationship with the divine, which is mostly
understood as the absolute Other or pure Otherness. According to the Jewish tradition, God Himself desires to enter into a relationship with
humankind and calls upon each human being during the event of revelation. A peculiar dialogue may then ensue between JHWH and the
human being, who experiences his/her own commitment to listen and answer (in Latin “respondēre”, in German “antworten”) to God’s call.29
(#_ftn29) Thanks to God’s primeval decision-revelation, the human being has the possibility to freely answer to such a call. Hence, according to
Jonas, God ultimately seems to provide the foundation for the human hendiadys of freedom and responsibility. This means that it is impossible
for philosophy fully to explain freedom and responsibility. On the other hand, we shall also see that the philosophical endeavour to do so does
not lose its meaning because of that impossibility.
A second Jewish echo in Jonas’ idea of responsibility is the so-called Book of Life, which he explicitly mentions in The Phenomenon of Life.30
(#_ftn30) However, in order to comprehend the relevance of this religious reference to Jonas’ ethics, we have to briefly revisit the origins of
Jonas’ hypothetical myth. What motivates Jonas to develop his thinking mythically is the following profound intuition:
And yet—we feel, temporality cannot be the whole story, because in man it has an inherently self-surpassing quality, of which the very fact and fumbling of our idea of eternity is a
cryptic signal. If everlastingness is a wrong concept, “eternity” may have other meanings—and a reference to the temporal of which our mortal experience, transcending its mere
transience in the stream of events, may sometimes bear witness.
31
 (#_ftn31)
Thus, Jonas’ myth serves two purposes: firstly, it tries to describe by means of symbols the human being’s capacity to transcend reality in space
and time; secondly, it hopes to answer the question of the origin of reality as such. So, in a sense, the myth provides a symbolic explanation for
the philosophical issues raised by the human experience of “transcending” in which—Jonas may now state—we witness something “eternal.”
The  same  happens  to  the  actions  performed  by  human  beings.  Such  actions  not  only  generate  consequences  in  space  and  time,  but
simultaneously gain transcendent relevance, as exactly suggested by the Jewish tradition:
We may say, for instance, that what we do now will make an indelible entry in the “Book of Life,” or leave an indelible mark in a transcendent order; that it will affect that order, if not
our own destiny, for good or for evil; that we shall be accountable for it before a timeless seat of justice, or—if we are not there for the accounting, because we have flowed down the river
of time—that our eternal image is determined by our present deed, and that through what we do to that image of ours here and now, we are responsible for the spiritual totality of
images that evergrowingly sums up the record of being and will be different for our deed.32 (#_ftn32)
In other words, Jonas is entertaining the possibility “that deeds inscribe themselves in an eternal memoir of time; that whatever is here enacted
somehow registers [...] in a transcendent realm.”33 (#_ftn33) So human beings are responsible not only for the earthly consequences of their
actions, but also for the transcendent and eternal ones, which may somehow affect the “stake which an undetermined and vulnerable eternity
has in us.”34 (#_ftn34) This is indeed a heavy burden for humanity to carry, one that has to be discussed and justified both from a theological and
a philosophical perspective.
“What” are we responsible “for”?
The philosophical justification for  Jonas’  theory  of  responsibility  is  the  core subject  of  the  well-known Das Prinzip Verantwortung [The
Imperative of Responsibility], published in 1979. Jonas’ argument may be summarized as follows: first, the phenomenon of life is a purpose of
nature, which becomes self-evident in the human being’s capacity to set and achieve aims and goals;35  (#_ftn35) second, the purposiveness
evidenced by life is “a fundamental self-affirmation of being, which posits it absolutely as the better over against nonbeing;”36 (#_ftn36) third,
there is an “ontological  axiom,” according to which purposiveness is a “good-in-itself, of which we grasp with intuitive certainty that it is
infinitely superior to any purposelessness of being;”37 (#_ftn37) fourth, the ontological axiom has an obligating force on human liberty, which “is
no longer its automatic executor but, with the power obtained from knowledge, can become its destroyer as well;”38 (#_ftn38) fifth, the human
being has the ethical duty to offset responsibility against indiscriminate freedom.
So, properly speaking, what are we responsible for? Jonas answers by means of the first commandment of his ethics: “the existence of mankind
comes first,” since “the possibility  of  there being responsibility  in the world,  which is  bound to the  existence of  men, is  of  all  objects  of
responsibility the first.”39 (#_ftn39) There is, however, a second commandment: humankind not only has to survive, but to “live well” too. This
second commandment  implies  that  the  organic  world also  has  to  be  included within  the domain of  responsibility,  since  it  represents  a
“necessary  condition”  of  man’s  own  existence.40  (#_ftn40)  However,  being  responsible  for  the  natural  world  does  not  at  all  mean  that
humankind is entitled to adopt an anthropocentric stance towards nature. On the contrary, any human being must put him/herself “at its
service, free of all appetite for appropriation.”41 (#_ftn41) To be sure, this is responsibility, the only conduct that it is possible to adopt if we are to
recognize and respect nature’s intrinsic value and truth:
In the truly human aspect, nature retains her dignity, which confronts the arbitrariness of our might. Ourselves being among her children, we owe allegiance to the kindred total of her
creations, of which the allegiance to our own existence is only the highest summit. This summit, rightly understood, comprises the rest under its obligation.42 (#_ftn42)
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In the end, Jonas identifies the ontological evidence of the above-mentioned axiom—according to which purposiveness is a good-in-itself—as
the basis of his theory of responsibility. It may seem surprising that this axiom is a presupposition of Jonas’ ethics, whose aim is to provide a
rational and convincing foundation for ethical obligation. Yet Jonas is aware that it is impossible to provide an ultimate justification:
Groundless itself [...], brought about with all the opaque contingency of brute fact, the ontological imperative institutes on its own authority the primordial “cause in the world” to which
a mankind once in existence, even if initially by blind chance, is henceforth committed. It is the prior cause of all causes that can ever become the object of collective and even individual
human responsibility.43 (#_ftn43)
However, an investigation into the ultimate basis of ethics and being is a task that ought to be carried out; otherwise the theory of responsibility
will lack complete justification. Once more, Jonas’ hypothetical myth concerning the creation of the cosmos offers an interesting insight into
problem: “By foregoing its own inviolateness the eternal ground allowed the world to be,”44 (#_ftn44) together with its distinguishing features.
Among  these,  the  most  relevant  is  the  manifestation  of  humankind,  together  with  the  typically  human  experiences  of  freedom  and
responsibility.
What is the myth’s relevance to Jonas’ conception of responsibility? By referring to key religious concepts (the Jewish Book of Life and the
Gnostic theory of the “transcendent ‘Image’ filled in, feature by feature, by our temporal deeds”)45 (#_ftn45) and in accord with the Kabbalah’s
conception of the relationship between human beings and God, Jonas comes to a powerful conclusion, which highlights the deep ambivalence
of freedom and responsibility: in a sense, humankind is even responsible for God. Precisely because of our technological development, God’s
image is in serious danger:
The image of God is in danger as never before, and on most unequivocal, terrestrial terms. That in these terms an eternal issue is at stake together with the temporal one—this aspect of
our responsibility can be our guard against the temptation of fatalistic acquiescence or the worse treason of après nous le deluge.46 (#_ftn46)
Hence, the combination of fragility and divinity within the object of responsibility—according to Jonas’ myth, God renounced His own being
and omnipotence in order to let the world be for itself—is precisely what human freedom must learn to respect and preserve. How can this duty
of preservation be effectively fulfilled?
The heuristics of feelings
There is no way of being assured a priori that human behaviour, whether individual or collective, will succeed in respecting the ontological
axiom. Since freedom is an essentially open, risky, and unforeseeable adventure, there is no guarantee that the power of human freedom will
actually protect and take care of the object of responsibility represented by the worldly adventure of life.  Quite the contrary,  through the
employment of technology, human power easily and quickly generates ambivalent effects, or produces consequences that may bring humanity
to ruin.
According to Jonas, the technological threat to the adventure of life is real and tangible. Because the stakes are so high, Jonas believes that the
only way of effectively dealing with this problem is to set limits on technology by giving priority to “the Bad over the Good Prognosis.” In other
words, “the prophecy of doom is to be given greater heed than the prophecy of bliss.”47 (#_ftn47) The recurring temptation to irresponsibly and
uncritically adopt technology as a device for fulfilling positive aims (in politics, economics, society, etc.) must be prevented by the growing
awareness of the fragility of the object of responsibility.
At this point in the discussion Jonas introduces the expression: the “heuristics of fear,” with which he states the amplified relevance for ethics
of the “revulsion of feeling, which acts ahead of knowledge to apprehend the value whose antithesis so affects us. We know the thing at stake
only when we know that it  is at stake.”  And he continues as follows: “We know much sooner what we do not want than what we want.
Therefore,  moral  philosophy must  consult  our  fears  prior  to our  wishes  to learn what  we really  cherish.”  However,  Jonas  adds  that the
heuristics of fear ought only to recover an adequate emotional motive for acting responsibly in the face of current ethical dilemmas: “although,
in consequence, the heuristics of fear is surely not the last word in the search for goodness, it is at least an extremely useful first word.”48
(#_ftn48)
In other words, the modern demand for technological progress has made it extremely difficult for humankind to be sufficiently aware of what is
at  stake—namely,  that  technology  puts  at  risk  the  possibility  of  worldly  and  human  life  as  such.  For  this  reason,  the  re-activation  of
responsibility is no automatic process, but a philosophical and pedagogical endeavour concerning individual and collective freedom. In this
effort to reactivate a sense of responsibility, emotional factors and feelings—such as fear, hope, shame, and guilt—play a central role.
Jonas  warns  that  humankind  should  not  wait  for  a  utopian  improvement,  unlike  those  ideologies  and  utopias  that  claim  to  fight  for
anthropological betterment.49 (#_ftn49) The ethics of responsibility offers a different kind of hope. Indeed, “hope is a condition for action”50
(#_ftn50) and a heuristics of fear ought to be used “in counterbalance to a heuristics of hope.”51 (#_ftn51) However, the ethics of responsibility
gives fear “its  rightful  place”:52  (#_ftn52)  “There are times—continues Jonas—when the drive needs moral encouragement,  when hope and
daring rather than fear and caution should lead. Ours is not one of them.”53 (#_ftn53) On the other hand, fear should not grow to the extent that
it paralyzes action. A correct interpretation of fear—states Jonas—ought to inspire the “courage of responsibility,” which takes care of an object
whose existence depends on the human being’s  ability  to act  with wisdom,  resoluteness,  promptness,  moderation,  and circumspection.54
(#_ftn54) The phenomenon of terrestrial life—in which human life is rooted—is such an object, and its perpetuation needs the human being’s
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attentive and active care.
According to Jonas, caring for terrestrial life means more than the mere prohibition of certain actions. More than just this, human freedom
ought to reflect positively that the object of responsibility is both valuable and a good-in-itself. Therefore, from an ethical point of view, this
object—namely, the terrestrial phenomenon of life and its human development—
Cannot compel the free will to make it its purpose, but it can extort from it the recognition that this would be its duty. If not in obeying, this
recognition manifests itself in the feeling of guilt: we failed to give the good its due.55 (#_ftn55)
In brief—according to Jonas—the tangible fear for the future of terrestrial life is a productive feeling that may help us anticipate undesirable
scenarios. The same can be said of guilt, a feeling that in Jonas’ view does not primarily express regret for something a person has done, but
that identifies a feeling of predictive repentance, which can preemptively illuminate human behaviour. Indeed, this form of repentance is able
to  stimulate  the  imagination  and  anticipate  the  possible  effects  of  the  refusal  to  recognize  the  good.  Human  behaviour  gains  ethical
self-awareness by facing up to the unpleasant probability that what is valuable and a good-in-itself could be rejected or destroyed.
Freedom as self-restraint
The fragile object of responsibility calls for care. Yet what should human beings do, precisely, if they are to act responsibly? Jonas answers that
we ought to preserve “the idea  of Man, which is such that it demands the presence of its embodiment in the world.”56  (#_ftn56) This idea
personifies one of the main ontological characteristics of life, namely its dynamic and self-transcending development.57 (#_ftn57) At the same
time human life highlights a highly specific feature: its self-transcending movement leads to transcendence as such, that is, to the metaphysical
supposition of  God and creation,  as shown by the hypothetical  myth concerning the creation of  the cosmos. Once again,  Jonas refers to
religious—and specifically Jewish—concepts in order to give a full account of the close liaison connecting the human being’s specificity to the
phenomenon of life and to the role played by God in the creation of the universe. In this respect we can quote the following wonderful passage
of Materie, Geist und Schöpfung [Matter, Mind, and Creation] (1988), in which Jonas explicitly recalls the sacredness of both terrestrial and
human life, and implicitly affirms that the comprehension of life and ethics cannot but lead to their metaphysical complement:
Therefore, the creative source, if it willed mind, also had to will life. And this it says in the beautiful attribute ascribed to God that we Jews so often recite in prayer: rozeh bachajim, “he
who wills life”: not only “the living God”, but “the God who wills life”, both for its own sake and, by means of the soul, as a cradle for the mind. Thus to a certain degree we might speak
of the sacredness of life, although life can be a wasteland, as can mind.
58
 (#_ftn58)
Jonas ends The Imperative of Responsibility with a similar appeal to preserve the integrity of the human being’s essence, since “something
sacred” discloses itself through humankind, something “inviolable under no circumstances (and which can be perceived independently from
religion).”59 (#_ftn59) Against the triumphalism of utopian ideologies, Jonas affirms that humanity courageously has to accept its demanding
task of humbly fulfilling freedom and responsibility:
The time for the headlong race of progress is over, not of course for guarded progress itself. Humbled we may feel, but not humiliated. Man’s mandate remains exacting enough outside
of paradise. To preserve the integrity of his essence, which implies that of his natural environment; to save this trust unstunted through the perils of the times, mostly the perils of his
own overmighty deeds—this is not a utopian goal, but not so very modest a task of responsibility for the future of man on earth.60 (#_ftn60)
This  modest  task  of  responsibility  consists  in  a  “power  over  power”61  (#_ftn61)  and requires  the  empowerment  of  freedom’s  capacity  for
self-restraint and sacrifice—two traditional moral values. The enhancement of responsibility calls for the aptitude to resist the seductions of
power and for the self-control of the human being’s “consciously exercised power.”62 (#_ftn62) So sacrifice and repentance are essential moral
values  for  the  technological  epoch,  since  these  moral  values  may play  an active  role  in  limiting  the  excesses  of  freedom and enhancing
responsibility.  Indeed,  the  most  hopeful  way  to  preserve  earthly  life  for  future  generations  is  to  make  an  effort  to  control  the  negative
consequences of humankind’s collective actions.
This is the basic justification for believing that an ought filters through the being of human life: any performed deed ought to respect the fact
that life always manifests more than what—strictly speaking—is currently there. Individual and collective freedom ought never to put at stake
this promise of  a future evidenced by humanity,  which highlights life’s  overall  ontological  feature—namely,  its  transcending dynamics of
freedom beyond the modern idea of res extensa. And responsibility ought to guarantee the fulfilment of that promise through the existence of
future generations. This is the nature of the human being’s responsibility towards history. Significantly, the Jewish term for “history” (toledot)
explicitly refers to the idea of “continuity among generations.”63 (#_ftn63)
In conclusion, Jonas goes in search of an ultimate foundation for his ethical reflection and his theory of the good, in order to face the challenges
currently posed by technological development. This investigation leads, however, to a cosmological hypothesis about the origins of the cosmos
as  such.  The  fulfilment  of  this  endeavour  requires  entering  the  domain  of  metaphysics  and  answering  with  the  help  of  myth  questions
concerning the role played by God in the creation of the cosmos. According to Jonas, this itinerary into metaphysics does not undermine the
independence of rational and ethical reflection, but provides a wider and deeper understanding of the human being’s place in the world. In this
respect, one of the results  of Jonas’  hypothetical myth concerning the origins of the cosmos is the complexity and twofoldness of  human
freedom, which can work for the accomplishment of good or evil, and finds in responsibility its essential counterpart. In this respect, Modernity
evidences a radical  and problematic change: incited by modern technological  development,  freedom believes wrongly in the possibility  of
getting rid of its own limits and responsibility. This, however, may cause the destruction of the worldly adventure of human freedom and life. In
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order to avert such disaster, Jonas’ ethical reflection aims at redressing the balance between freedom and responsibility. Indeed, concepts and
images borrowed from the Jewish tradition offer an incomparable contribution to this philosophical endeavour.
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